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Some Coasian Problems with Posnerian Law & Economics
Abstract. The methodological approaches of Ronald Coase and Richard Posner are compared
and contrasted with regard to microeconomic theory and its application to law and economics.
The central divide is whether positive transaction cost requires a major reworking of the core of
neoclassical price theory (Coase: yes; Posner: no). To provide evidence on this matter, the paper
examines Posner’s well-know treatise Economic Analysis of Law and, in particular, his use of
two basic price theory tools (downward sloping demand curve; competitive model of
demand/supply) for positive and normative analysis of labor markets and labor law. Neither
construct is found robust with respect to variation in transaction cost. An alternative positive
transaction cost representation of labor demand and wage determination models also reveals that
Posner’s conclusions on the efficiency effects of various laws and regulations are not wellgrounded. The conclusion, as Coase put forward in his Nobel address, is that core tools of
microeconomics are contingent on transaction cost and the institutional structure of production.

Modern law and economics (L&E) is widely acknowledged as originating at the University of
Chicago. Although a number of people connected with Chicago are recognized for their
important contributions, undoubtedly two names stand-out as the seminal figures. They are
Ronald Coase and Richard Posner.
The literature tends to homogenize Coase and Posner as fellow contributors to a common
intellectual project, frequently portrayed as application of microeconomic principles to the
subject of law (e.g., Harrison and Theeuwes 2008: 5-6) . Deidre McCloskey (1997) argues,
however, that a closer reading of Coase and Posner reveals that they promote two very distinct
and even antithetical approaches to L&E. She says on this matter (p. 239):
“law and economics as it has developed in, say Richard Posner’s work and as it has been
absorbed into the mainstream of economics is not the same things as what might be
called a ‘Coasean’ approach. Coase and Posner, though often treated as identical,
represent different views on how to conduct economics.”

The dividing line that separates Coase and Posner, claims McCloskey, turns on their
different methodological approaches to economics. She begins by describing the Coasian
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approach as “commonsense empiricism” and the Posnerian approach as “rationalism.” The latter
is also characterized (following Coase) as “blackboard economics” and the former as “antiblackboard economics” (p. 239). On the next page, however, McCloskey moves to a different
and fundamentally more strategic methodological divide centered on the role of transaction cost
in economic theory.
According to McCloskey, on one side of this debate is Coase and a relatively small group
of Austrians, institutionalists (new and old), and other non-conventional economic thinkers
(including McCloskey). Their methodological position is that transaction cost (TC) is ubiquitous,
often substantial-sized, and significantly affects economic behavior; hence, economic theory
needs to incorporate positive TC as a foundational construct – that is, “from the ground up” (also
see Williamson 1993). Coase (1992) claims in his Nobel address that doing so will “bring about
a complete change…. in what is called price theory or microeconomics” (p. 713). McCloskey
expresses this idea as: “transaction costs push our world unpredictably far from the blackboard
optimum” (p. 241) – so far, in fact, that Coase (1988) concludes economists and practitioners of
L&E must “discard the approach at present used” (p. 16).
On the other side of this methodological fault-line, says McCloskey, are Posner, most
conventional economic theorists, and the main body of modern L&E scholars. Their position is
that the theorems and models of standard microeconomics are fruitful abstractions even though
they rest on an implicit assumption of zero TC. From this perspective, positive TC does not
invalidate or require major reworking of the core of microeconomic theory; rather, TC is useful
as a way to extend and generalize this core for a set of issues (e.g., market failure; non-market
institutions) where imperfect information, cognitive constraints, and incomplete contracts are
important considerations. In this spirit, Posner (1993) allows that Coase and colleagues “correct
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neoclassical theory, for example by adding transaction costs to the analytic framework” (p. 78)
but at the same time asserts, “I reject any suggestion that new institutional economics [positive
TC economics] ought somehow to displace the rest of microeconomics” (p. 76). Echoing
Friedman (1953), Posner defends neoclassical price with the observation it can be “a useful tool
of discovery even if it is unrealistic” and “even though its basic premise [e.g., zero TC] was
false” (p. 77).
McCloskey’s portrait of the issues and positions of Coase and Posner may be
iconoclastically framed in places but the divergence between the two men is most certainly real,
indicated by the quotations featured above and also a deeper perusal of their respective writings
on the subject (e.g., Posner 1993; Coase 1993). Further, this debate is not just between two
individual Chicago L&E scholars but is representative of a much larger and more general divide
spanning more than a century’s time over the proper weight given in economic theory to the
deductive a priori method and inductive empiricist method.
Economists are well-known for having small appetite for methodological disputes, in part
because they tend to generate more heat than light. The dispute over method between Coase and
Posner is fundamental, however, to the direction of modern law and economics and bears
examination as long as the light-to-heat ratio remains well-above unity. This I endeavor to do, in
part by using concrete examples drawn from economic theory to distinguish Coase vs. Posner.
Although the position of both authors has pros and cons, the thesis staked-out here is that at the
end of the day Coase wins the argument. I illustrate this with what may be considered a case
study of sorts; that is, examination of Chapters 1 and 11 of Posner’s well-known treatise
Economic Analysis of Law (1st ed. 1973; 7th ed. 2007). Chapter 1 lays-out in general terms the
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economic tools Posner uses throughout the book; Chapter 11 applies these tools to the topic of
employment regulation.
Consistent with the position taken by Coase, I demonstrate that: (1) core concepts of
standard microeconomics are not robust with respect to variation in transaction cost; (2) Posner’s
approach to theorizing L&E therefore lacks a solid micro-foundation (certainly for labor
markets); and (3) for this reason many of Posner’s policy conclusions on labor and employment
are poorly grounded in theory. As indicated, these propositions are developed for one sector of
the economy – labor markets – and for one area of L&E – labor and employment law, although
certain parts (but not all) generalize to other areas of economic analysis.
Posner, Price Theory, and L&E
Posner’s colleague at Chicago, Gary Becker, identifies an “economic approach” to studying
human behavior based on the three pillars of maximizing behavior, stable preferences and market
equilibrium (Becker 1976). The first two components yield the economist’s model of the rational
actor. Becker generalizes the concept of “market” to all mechanisms that sort, allocate and
coordinate scarce resources (e.g., a marriage market) and argues that rational behavior guided by
money and shadow prices and operating within the constraints posed by given institutional
structures and resource limitations (e.g., imperfect information) yields efficient equilibrium
outcomes (also see Lazear 2000). In the spirit of economic imperialism, Becker concludes, “I
have come to the conclusion that the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is
applicable to all human behavior” (p. 8).
Posner takes Becker’s economic approach and applies it to the legal field, as indicated in
the citation to Becker in the first footnote of Chapter 1 of Economic Analysis of Law (2007: 3).
His valuable and insightful contribution is to treat laws and regulations as additional sources of
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optimization constraint and relative price variation (often in the form of opportunity cost
differentials) and to work out the consequences for human behavior and economic efficiency.
Posner tells readers in the Preface that “The explication of economics in this book
stresses the unity, simplicity and power, but also the subtlety of economic principles” (p. xxi).
These economic principles are then outlined in Chapter 1 in the first section titled “Fundamental
Concepts” (p. 3). Included are the core elements of conventional microeconomic theory, such as
rational utility maximizing behavior, opportunity cost, the law of demand, demand and supply
analysis, competitive equilibrium, and efficiency. The Coase Theorem is also introduced but in
the context of its implications when transaction cost is zero (p. 7).
The grounding of Posnerian-style L&E in standard microeconomic price theory is
indicated by the first two diagrams featured in the book. They are reproduced here as Figure 1
panels (a) and (b), respectively.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The first diagram depicts a downward sloping demand curve. It is featured by Posner as
the first diagram because the curve illustrates the most fundamental behavioral relation driving
modern L&E. This relation is the law of demand and associated principle of substitution; that is,
price and quantity demanded are ceteris paribus inversely related. In introducing the demand
curve, Posner tells readers, “The concept of man as a rational utility maximize implies that
people respond to incentives” (p. 4) and then demonstrates in the next paragraph with the
demand curve diagram how they respond in a predictable way to incentives. That is, if the price
(money or shadow) of some scarce good goes up people on average consume less of it and
substitute toward some now-cheaper alternative. The example Posner uses to illustrate the
application of the Law of Demand to legal analysis is the quantity of criminal behavior in
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society. If the price of committing criminal acts is increased by stiffer jail sentences, L&E
predicts that fewer people will commit crimes (ceteris paribus).
The second diagram in the book is the demand/supply (DS) curve model, shown in panel
(b). It is featured second because the point of competitive equilibrium establishes the benchmark
level of prices for the demand curve diagram in panel (a) and the benchmark level of efficiency
(maximum) for welfare comparisons among alternative policies and legal regimes. The
mechanics of price determination are only lightly touched on by Posner. Instead, the diagram is
used to emphasize that competition via DS leads to an equilibrium where prices are equal to
opportunity costs (on the margin); through the exchange process resources tend to gravitate
toward their most valuable use; profit (and incentives more generally) are a magnet drawing
resources into an activity; and at a competitive equilibrium efficiency is maximized since all
gains from trade have been exploited. Posner in his discussion of how competition guides
resources to their most valuable brings in the Coase theorem; McCloskey claims, however, that
in this zero TC rendition the proposition “is actually Adam Smith’s theorem” (p. 240).

Theory Applied: Regulation of the Employment Relationship
Posner takes these theoretical tools of standard microeconomics and applies them to analysis of
more than two dozen separate topic areas in law. The area I focus on is the labor market and
L&E analysis of employment regulation (Chapter 11). Posner defines the domain of employment
regulation broadly to include both individual and collective dimensions, such as regulation of
individual termination and company-union collective bargaining. These two areas are sometimes
separately distinguished as, respectively, employment law and labor law.
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I have gone through Chapter 11 and culled-out eight representative propositions and
conclusions. In each case I give partial or full quotation in order to ensure that this list closely
reflects what Posner has written. The purpose of this list is to make or reinforce certain points
about L&E that become the object of Coasean critique in the next section.
Labor markets are broadly competitive in nature since “labor monopsony…. is not a
serious problem in this country” (p. 342) and “monopolies and cartels carry within
them the seeds of their own destruction” (p. 343). Even where competition is not fully
effective due to imperfect information or other frictions, one can nonetheless presume
that labor outcomes are (mostly) efficient because otherwise unexploited gains from
trade “would be negotiated voluntarily” (p. 349). The base-line for analysis, therefore,
is “an efficient common law of labor relations” (p. 341).
Unions act as a labor cartel and win higher wages for their members but at the cost of
economic inefficiency and “reduction in the demand for labor caused by union wage
scales” (p. 343). The National Labor Relations Act “is a kind of reverse Sherman Act,
designed to encourage cartelization of labor markets” (p. 344).
Workers were not victimized by early 20th century “yellow-dog contracts” (a
provision that says a worker agrees as a condition of employment to refrain from
joining a labor union) because in a competitive labor market “the worker presumably
would demand compensation for giving up his right to join a union” (p. 341).
“Further evidence that job security is inefficient is that ….employment-at-will is the
normal form of work contract in the United States. The worker can quit when he
wants… An employer who gets a reputation for arbitrarily discharging employees
will have to pay new employees a premium…” (p. 348).
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A legal minimum wage “reinforces the effect of unionization on wage rates” (p. 352)
and thus represents another form of monopoly influence in labor markets; it also is
ineffective in poverty reduction and most harms the job prospects of the workers who
are most disadvantaged (e.g., black teenagers).
“The Occupational Safety and Health Act …. is arguably superfluous. The employer
has a selfish interest in providing the optimal…. level of worker health and safety” (p.
354).
Women’s lower wages relative to men are mostly due to their different human capital
and occupational choice decisions, made in light of different family roles and
preferences. These differences “would have narrowed even without government
intervention” and “not all employment discrimination on grounds of sex is
inefficient.” (p. 357).
Pension protection may well not be necessary because (in part) “[t]he employer’s
incentive to abuse the power that incomplete vesting conferred on him by reneging on
his unwritten contract to deal fairly with his employees would be held in check by his
concern for preserving a reputation for fair dealing” (p. 363-64).

This list is useful because it illustrates three noteworthy features of Posner’s style of
economic reasoning applied to law that are distinctly non-Coasean.
The first is the universality premise of L&E and its underlying paradigm of economic
imperialism. That is, the methodological presumption is that the standard tools of
microeconomics and, in particular, the two diagrams featured in Figure 1 (the downward sloping
labor demand curve; competitive price determination by demand and supply) are in principle
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applicable to all areas of human behavior, including labor markets and employment
relationships. This premise differentiates modern (Posnerian) L&E not only from Coase but from
traditional labor and employment law and the institutional type of economics it is based on. That
is, modern L&E treats labor markets as akin to other markets except for second-order “details,”
per Posner’s use of the DS diagram to analyze a minimum wage (p. 352). Traditional
labor/employment law, on the other hand, maintains labor markets are first-order unique and
non-competitive institutions because of the human nature of labor and long-term nature of the
employment relationship; not surprisingly, therefore, they typically do not use a DS diagram in
discussions of the minimum wage.
The second feature of this list is it reveals Posner’s consistent application of the price
theory principles developed in Chapter 1 to analysis of labor and employment law. The law of
demand and downward sloping labor demand curve in Figure 1 are explicit or implicit in
Posner’s analysis of each item listed above. That is, every employment regulation or workers’
organization with “bite” raises the effective price of labor (either directly through a higher labor
compensation or indirectly though lower productivity) and therefore leads (ceteris paribus) to a
contraction of employment opportunities. Thus, unions, minimum wages, employment security
provisions, and equal opportunity legislation have a backfire effect (e.g., pp. 353, 357) since they
hurt some of the target group they are meant to help (e.g., black teenagers or working mothers
priced out of jobs). With regard to the Americans with Disabilities Act ADA), for example,
Posner asserts, “The goal is to increase employment opportunities for disabled persons; yet the
actual effect has been to reduce the number of disabled persons who are employed” (p. 361).
One reads the list of items above and also sees the competitive model of labor markets
and DS theory of wage determination in Figure 1 heavily represented. For example, the
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competitive-based theory of compensating wage differentials (from Adam Smith) figures
prominently in many of Posner’s evaluations of labor law. According to Posner, banning yellowdog contracts or mandating maternity benefits neglects the fact that in competitive markets
workers get the cash-value of these rights in the form of higher wages; likewise, employers are
refrained from unfairly firing workers since they will develop a reputation as a bad employer and
have to pay a higher wage to attract workers. More explicitly, Posner uses the competitive model
of demand/supply to analyze and evaluate a minimum wage law.
Equally important, the model of competitive labor markets – augmented where necessary
by appeal to the Coase theorem (for competitive-like solutions to bilateral monopoly,
externalities and other market imperfections) and the wealth maximizing tendency of the
common law – provides the foundation for Posner’s argument that observed employment
outcomes are on prima facie grounds (typically) a first approximation to an efficient outcome.
The reasoning is that if outcomes are not efficient then there is, in effect, “money left on the
table” and where competition is present these rents will be whittled down until all gains from
trade are exhausted (p. 10).
Because Posnerian L&E assumes as a base-line proposition that resources are (more or
less) efficiently ordered, it follows as a matter of logic that a labor law or employment regulation
enters the scene as “guilty until proven innocent.” That is, if the analysis starts out with “assume
a competitive labor market” and “assume an efficient regime of common law,” it is a an easy and
non-controversial step to draw a DS diagram of labor markets (e.g., Posner’s Figure 11. 2),
locate the status quo as the competitive equilibrium, and demonstrate that every labor law and
employment regulation listed above is destructive of social wealth. The guilty verdict may be
swung to innocent but the onus is on proponents of regulation to make this case; in particular,
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they must demonstrate compelling evidence of significant and persistent market failure and
inability of private bargaining (the Coase theorem) to solve the (alleged) problem.
Posner’s default “guilty until proven innocent” position on employment regulation is
illustrated in his analysis of employment at will. Two options are considered: first, employment
at will (no restriction on hire and fire) and, second, a just-cause termination mandate (fire only
for demonstrated good cause). The thrust of his argument is in favor of the “no regulation”
option; he observes, for example, that hire and fire promotes labor market flexibility while
workers’ interests are adequately protected by competitive market forces and employers’ selfinterest in keeping a productive workforce. Thus, he concludes, “it is difficult to see how
workers in general can benefit from such a requirement (p. 349) – a logical deduction if
competition has already led employers and workers to the contract curve (or close thereto).
The third noteworthy feature of this list of labor law conclusions is that while Posner’s
evaluation is in each case negative (i.e., “free market”) he nonetheless asserts that they are the
joint product of value-neutral (aka, scientific) tools of microeconomic theory and a widely
accepted welfare criterion. On one hand, L&E is avowedly normative because practitioners such
as Posner purposefully use economic analysis to evaluate the welfare effects of law and
regulation and derive policy conclusions and recommendations therefrom. Yet, on the other
hand, Posner rebuts critics who assert L&E has (in his words) a “conservative bias” (p. 26). He
asserts that the microeconomic tools used in L&E are “ideologically neutral or balanced” (p. 27)
and the L&E welfare criterion of wealth maximization asserts no more than “in a world of scarce
resources waste should be regarded as immoral” (p. 27).
Interestingly, Coase does not object to many/most of the normative free market
implications Posner derives with the help of modern microeconomics because he, like Posner, is
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a proponent of economic liberalism. But at the level of theory, McCloskey is correct to argue that
Posner’s approach to L&E has much greater affinity with Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand
theorem of Arrow and Debreu than Coase’s positive TC institutional approach to law and
economics. The ramifications of this divide for economic analysis of law are next highlighted.

The Consequences of Positive Transaction Cost: Theory and Policy
Coase and Posner broadly agree on several points. One is the definition of transaction cost (see
Benham and Benham 2010 for a general review). Coase (1937) started out defining TC (he did
not, however, use this exact term) as “costs of using the price mechanism” and later expressed
this idea as “costs of contracting” (1991: 73). Posner (2007) defines TC in a similar way; that is,
“costs of effecting a transfer of rights” (p. 34).
The two men also agree that transaction cost are always positive and sometimes high.
Coase (1992) says in his Nobel lecture transaction costs “are pervasive in the economy” while
Posner (2007) states, “transaction costs are never zero; in fact they may be quite high” (p. 51).
Where they fundamentally disagree is on the consequences of positive transaction cost
for theory and legal analysis. Based on the foregoing review, I assert that the main
methodological issues separating Coase and Posner may be framed as these two complementary
hypotheses (with Posner’s position taken as the null and Coase’s as the rejection of the null).
H1: incorporation of positive TC does not affect in a substantively significant way
either the theoretical structure or predictive content of standard microeconomic
theory, say as represented by the two panels of Figure 1.
H2: incorporation of positive TC does not affect in a substantively significant way the
positive predictions and normative welfare conclusions of modern L&E regarding
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alternative laws and policy regimes, say as represented by the labor and employment
law propositions listed above.
Each hypothesis is separately examined, starting with H1.
Theory. Hypothesis H1 asserts that variation in TC from zero to positive does not
compromise the logical integrity and predictive content of basic microeconomic tools, such as
the downward sloping demand curve and competitive DS diagram. Coasean logic indicates this
hypothesis is false, and substantively so, for the case of labor markets. The reason is also
Coasean – variation in TC from zero to positive fundamentally changes the institutional structure
of production and, therefore, the nature of labor demand and the market for labor services.
The neoclassical labor demand curve and competitive labor market diagram are derived
with the taken-for-granted assumption that the economy has a factor market for labor services
and capitalist employment relationship. In Chapter 11, for example, Posner draws a DS diagram
with the wage rate (W) on the vertical axis and quantity of labor (L), measured as either hours or
people, on the horizontal axis. The demand curve shows (ceteris paribus) how many
hours/people firms want to hire from the labor market at various market wage rates; the DS
diagram shows how competitive bidding in the labor market between labor demanders
(employers) and labor suppliers (would-be employees) determines an equilibrium price and
quantity of labor services. This equilibrium is an efficient outcome, as earlier described.
The problem for Posner and neoclassical economics is that both diagrams have no logical
existence with either zero or positive TC (i.e., they are not robust to TC period). If TC is zero,
Coase demonstrates that the institutional structure of production disaggregates (disagglomerates) to its lowest level of decentralization. The reason is that coordination of the
division of labor (e.g., the separate tasks required to produce Adam Smith’s pins) can be
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performed by two modes – price and competition in markets and command and administration in
organizations (e.g., firms) – and if TC = 0 then market coordination is everywhere favored.
Demsetz (1991) calls this institutional structure of production “perfect decentralization” and says
in this economy “each individual acts as a firm, selling the output of his effort to other
individuals acting in a similar fashion” (p. 162).
The implication of perfect decentralization is that all firms are single-person
proprietorships (independent contractors, etc.) and buy/sell the intermediate goods needed at the
various positions in the division of labor though product market transactions. The firms may be
large agglomerations of capital and workers but the workers provide their services, not as
employees of (say) Ford Motor, but as John Jones Windshield Installation, Inc. and Nancy Smith
Rent-a-Marketing Executive, Corp.
The logical implications for both parts of Figure 1 are dire. Specifically, with zero TC the
institutional structure of production is such that: (1) firms do not have employees (as that term is
understood in the law); (2) accordingly, firms have no demand curve for labor (in the factor
market sense) and panel (a) is thus an empty space; and (3) the DS diagram in panel (b) also
disappears since firms do not compensate labor with a rental rate per time period (a “wage”),
they have no demand curve for employees so one of the Marshallian blades is missing, and there
is no factor market so the supply curve of labor transposes to a product market DS diagram.
Neoclassical economics is built on a zero TC foundation and what the above
demonstrates is that in this situation an economy has no labor market, employment relationship,
labor demand curve, or demand/supply model of wage determination. The tools in Figure 1 are
still applicable to product markets and the associated legal topics in Posner’s book but they are
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not scientifically grounded logical abstractions for labor and, therefore, for the evaluation of
labor and employment law in Chapter 11.
Posner may retort that this demonstration is perhaps interesting but also a straw man
since it rests on a pure Walrasian TC =0 model when (per a previous quotation) he adopts a more
elastic version of neoclassical theory in Economic Analysis of Law that makes room for TC > 0
(e.g., limited information, bounded rationality). That is, one could surely argue that the labor
demand curve and DS model of labor markets remain viable and useful abstractions even if (say)
employers do not have perfect information and workers cannot compute all alternative outcomes;
to maintain otherwise is to (purportedly) make the dissenter’s mistake of discarding
microeconomic theory because its fails the test of realism.
The counter-response is that the critical flaw is not lack of realism but lack of good logic.
This is a more serious charge against any theory given that the essence of a theory is a logical
chain of cause-effect reasoning. To appreciate this, consider the alternative case of a TC > 0
economy. It turns out that both diagrams in Figure 1 again disappear.
By wide agreement, imperfect information and limited human cognitive ability are
central to generating positive transaction cost. Positive transaction cost, in turn, means
buying/selling in markets consumes scarce resources and creates incomplete contracts. A
consequence of TC > 0 is that it becomes economical to shift some of the coordination of the
division of labor inside firms (i.e., “make” replaces “buy”) and have the visible hand of
management replace the invisible hand of the market. Management coordination, however,
requires that one or more people in the organization have power and authority to direct/control
the performance of others. Under a common law legal code, managers to do not have this
authority with contractors; they do have it, however, with employees. When TC = 0 controls
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rights have zero economic value since the environment is fully known and buyers/sellers can
write complete contracts; as TC grows, however, future events become more uncertain, contract
incompleteness expands, and gaining control rights to direct labor by converting contractors to
employees takes on greater value. The upshot is that with TC > 0 the institutional structure of
production starts to agglomerate, multi-person firms appear, these firms obtain labor services by
hiring employees, the economy forms a specialized factor market for labor where buyers and
sellers interact, and out of this interaction is established a rate of pay (wage) and level of
employment.
On a surface level a positive TC economy appears consistent with the microeconomic
models in Figure 1 and the Posnerian position; that is, firms have a demand for labor and the
economy has a labor market with many buyers and sellers. Figure 1 gives abstract
representations of both realities. The problem, however, is with the nature of these
representations. In particular, with positive transaction cost neither labor demand nor wage
determination take the form represented in Figure 1.
The key consideration is the incomplete nature of labor contracts. Because of bounded
rationality and costly information, labor contracts cannot specify every task and performance
standard and, hence, have large gaps that are filled-in as the production process unfolds. Further,
positive TC creates frictions and interdependencies (e.g., types of asset specificity emphasized
by Williamson (1985)) that create an incentive for firms and workers to replace spot contracting
with longer-term relational contracting. Entrepreneurs, therefore, find it is more economical
(ceteris paribus) to re-hire incumbent employees (insiders) rather than replace them with new
hires from the external labor market (outsiders). Also, since labor is embodied in people, work
effort is volitional and entrepreneurs find they can get more of it by investing (up to some point)
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in job security, promotion systems, dispute resolution programs, and other accoutrements of
internal employment systems.
For these and other reasons, insiders and outsiders in firms are not perfect substitutes.
Given this, then both the labor demand curve and DS curves in Figure 1 change shape. If
workers are not homogeneous, the labor supply curve to the firm becomes upward sloping as at
any given wage some workers are preferred over others. Also, firms acquire some degree of
independent wage-setting ability when labor has some element of immobility. The labor market,
therefore, transitions from competitive to imperfectly competitive with some non-zero element of
monopsony. Just as the marginal cost curve no longer yields a well-defined product supply curve
for a firm in an imperfectly competitive output market (e.g., a monopolist), by similar reasoning
the marginal revenue product curve no longer yields a well-defined labor demand curve for a
firm (e.g., a monopsonist) in an imperfectly competitive labor market (Fleisher and Kniesner
1980: 198). Hence, with TC > 0 the conclusion is that the neoclassical labor demand curve in
panel (a) does not have logical existence and, as it disappears, so does one blade of the DS model
in panel (b). Without a well-defined labor demand curve in panel (b), the wage determination
process has to be closed with some other device, such as management “take it or leave it” wage
offers in labor markets having more job seekers than job vacancies.
To summarize, Coase’s claim (earlier quoted) is that inclusion of transaction cost “will
bring about a complete change …. in what is called price theory or microeconomics.” The notion
of what comprises “complete change” surely varies among economists but, arguably, the above
may qualify as an example. That is, when transaction cost is brought into the standard price
theory model of labor markets its two most fundamental tools – the downwards sloping labor
demand curve and the competitive model DS wage determination – do not survive as well-
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defined logical constructs. Equally significant, by transaction cost reasoning the entire concept of
a competitive labor market turns out to be a logical non sequitur and, accordingly, one concludes
labor markets are always and everywhere imperfectly competitive.
If logical congruence was the sole test of a theory, at least for Chapter 11 Posner would
have to replace the two diagrams in Figure 1 with alternative constructions. One candidate for
panel (b) is a monopsony labor market diagram, perhaps broadly interpreted as representing
monopsonistic competition or some variant. Thus, in this new set-up there are still buyers and
sellers of labor who interact in markets; what changes is the institutional structure of the market,
the nature and balance of the competitive process, the predicted level of wages and other terms
and conditions of employment, and their welfare properties. Likewise, we know from previous
research by Becker (1962) that due to the elemental existence of scarcity and budget constraints
there must exist at some broad level an inverse relation between price and quantity demanded.
Instead of a well-defined monotonic relationship, however, Coasean reasoning suggests labor
demand curves have some indeterminacy and perhaps an upward sloping segment (because for
any given wage W and employment level L there are a range of possible marginal products due
to volitional effort and incomplete contracts). One way to represent this is to replace the pencilthin demand curve in panel (a) with a broad shaded band.
For a person committed to an instrumentalist methodology, as Posner so indicates, these
arguments based on logic are not determinative; rather, the ultimate test of the utility of a theory
is its predictive ability. Although I cannot here go into a detailed analysis of empirical research
on labor markets, let me suggest that here too the evidence is likely to support Coase more than
Posner. Two examples are illustrative.
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Regarding the competitive model of labor markets in panel (b), Ashenfelter, Farber and
Ransom (2010) summarize a symposium of empirical papers on labor markets and wage
determination published in the Journal of Labor Economics. They conclude (p. 208-09),
“The remarkable common feature of all the studies reported here is the high ‘monopsony
power’ implied by the firm-level estimates of labor supply…. In general, if exploited by
employers, such high rates of monopsony power imply large welfare losses to society
through the misallocation of labor and considerable redistribution of income away from
workers and to residual claimants…. The articles in this issue provide remarkable
evidence that labor markets are far from competitive.”
Regarding the neoclassical labor demand curve in panel (a), Doucouliagos and Stanley
(2009) do a meta-analysis of 1,474 estimated wage elasticities reported in minimum wage
studies. They conclude, first, the employment effect is effectively zero – consistent with an
institutional labor demand “band” but not a negatively-sloped neoclassical labor demand line
and, second, minimum wage research is skewed by publication bias toward results that favor
minimum wage critics (i.e., the research has a “conservative bias”). They conclude (p. 422-23):
“We still find strong evidence of publication selection for significantly negative
employment elasticities, but no evidence of a meaningful adverse employment effect
when selection effects are filtered from the research record….If this interpretation were
true, it implies that the conventional neoclassical labor model is an inadequate
characterization of the US labor markets (especially the market for teenagers). It also
implies that other labor market theories, such as those involving oligopolistic or
monopsonistic competition, or efficiency wages or heterodox models, are more
appropriate.”
Policy. Hypothesis H2 can be disposed of in shorter fashion. Because of their disparate
methodological positions, Posner and Coase counsel and practice quite different approaches to
policy evaluation.
Posner takes the standard theoretical tools of neoclassical economics, adopts the
Friedmanite proposition that labor markets can be treated “as if” they are (mostly) competitive,
and then compares efficiency outcomes before and after adoption of various proposed labor laws
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and employment regulations. As demonstrated above, the verdict he reaches is “guilty-leaning”
for each law and regulation put under the microscope. Coase, on the other hand, works from a
positive TC framework and, hence, all human-constructed institutions – including markets – are
imperfect. His dictum, therefore, is that the economist cannot decide a policy issue on a priori
reasoning from an abstract model of a perfect (or quasi-perfect) world but, instead, has to decide
the matter based on an empirical weighing of benefits and costs. Coase therefore follows
Demsetz (1969) in claiming that the Posnerian approach commits the “Nirvanna fallacy” -- that
is, it evaluates law and regulation with a model that presupposes resources are already optimally
allocated. The high probability of a negative verdict is built into the process.
To see if a Coasean approach yields different conclusions, let’s return to the list of labor
laws and regulations listed above that Posner in his Chapter 11 renders a “mostly guilty” verdict.
It will be seen that if the neoclassical labor demand line in panel (a) and DS curves in panel (b)
are replaced with a labor demand band and a monopsony diagram the conclusions on all the
listed labor laws and regulations immediately shift. That is, where once the guilty verdict was
more or less foreordained now the verdict is an open question which depends on the strength of
empirical evidence pro and con.
For example, consider unions (item #2) and minimum wages (item #5). Posner’s charge
is that they reduce employment, raise wages above the competitive level, and create a
deadweight efficiency loss. If the labor demand relationship is a band, both institutions may have
a zero effect on employment -- particularly for modest-to-moderate wage hikes. In an imperfect
world, an exogenous increase in labor costs can be offset or absorbed through alternative buffers
and adjustment channels; for example, managers can tighten up on organizational slack and
employees can increase work effort. Likewise, if the labor market has a monopsony element then
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both unions and minimum wages may not only leave employment unaffected but also improve or
at least not harm efficiency. The case for and against these government interventions, therefore,
cannot be deduced on a priori theoretical grounds because their effect is a priori indeterminate.
That is, since both unions and minimum wage laws can be either distortion-creating or
distortion-reducing, the only neutral way to render a verdict is through a balanced assessment of
empirical evidence from case to case, albeit with due attention to generalized findings from past
empirical evidence and the implications/predictions of positive TC theory.
Or consider mandates that abridge employment at will (item #4) and regulate workplace
safety and health conditions (item #6). For reasons described in the previous paragraph, these
regulations may not have the perverse employment backfire effect Posner alleges because firms
can absorb and offset the increase in costs through other channels. Also, Posner’s main argument
for why these mandates are unnecessary is because in a competitive labor market demand/supply
create compensating wage differentials that not only pay workers for the additional risk but also
motivate employers to provide the efficient level of workplace security and safety. However, in a
world of asymmetric and costly information, constraints on labor mobility, incomplete contracts
and consequent incentives for opportunism, and (typically) an excess supply of job seekers,
compensating wage differentials may be inefficiently low or even non-existent. Accordingly,
employers often (not always) have a dominant position in labor markets while the markets
themselves yield wages and conditions below the social optimum because of positive TC
contracting problems (externalities, public goods, moral hazard, etc.).
Thus, the case for and against employment at will and safety and health regulation, like
for unions and minimum wages, cannot be determined on an a priori basis since in a human
world all alternatives are imperfect. The only viable recourse, therefore, is to examine the weight
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of empirical evidence. As Coase (1988) states, “Realism of assumptions [TC > 0] forces to
analyze the world that exists, not some imaginary world that does not” (p. 65).

Conclusion
Posner criticizes Coase’s position as “disdain for theory” (Posner JEP 205) and “stark rejection
of the theories and empirical methods of modern economics” (JTISE p. 80). Coase (1993 reply) ,
on the other hand, claims “I do not dislike abstraction…. My aim is to bring into existence and
economic theory which is solidly based” (p. 97).
Economists can in good faith come down on either side of this debate – as they have done
for more than a century. As I have endeavored to demonstrate, however, Posner’s position on
methodology is not well-grounded on several counts. By this rendering, Coase is not “antitheory” but “anti-zero TC theory” – a distinction McCloskey (1997) emphasizes but which
Posner elides. Likewise, Posner’s position is that taking into account positive TC does not
endanger the main body of neoclassical theory, including elementary concepts such as demand
curves and demand/supply diagrams. At least for labor markets, this paper shows that in fact
these constructs are not invariant to TC and, in fact, have no logical existence in either a TC = 0
or TC > 0 economy. This finding supports Coase’s institutional position. Finally, this paper also
shows that the Coase vs. Posner approach to theory-building has large ramifications for the field
of law and economics and its positive and normative evaluation of law and regulation. The
Posnerian approach puts much weight on a priori deductive conclusions from neoclassical
models and thereby predisposes the verdict toward “guilty until proven innocent;” the Coasian
approach, on the other, hand, opts for an institutional-style of theory where markets (and
alternatives) are imperfect and the verdict on law and regulation therefore is a priori
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indeterminate and must be decided on the weight of the evidence pro and con. Such a review is
outside the bounds of this paper; two suggestive examples, however, support Coase.
In all such debates, opposing positions typically contain their own insights and truths and
this paper in no way denies this due to Posner. The paper does maintain, however, that Posner
substantially overstates the merits of his case and the defects of Coase’s. But, of course, this is
what a good prosecuting attorney does. Further, Posner appears to have moved somewhat in
Coase’s direction.
In 2010, Posner was awarded the “Ronald H. Coase Medal” by the American Law and
Economics Association. In his published address he considers the lessons of the 2007-2020
economic crisis and comes to this Coasean conclusion: “We have discovered that economic
theory is more fragile and provides a less secure basis for understanding economic behavior and
improving economic policy than we had thought.” Ronald Coase would say “Amen.”

24

References
Addison, John, and Barry Hirsch. 1997. "The Economic Effects of Employment Regulation: What Are
the Limits?" In Bruce Kaufman, ed., Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship,
pp. 125–78. Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association.
Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization.” American Economic Review, 72 (4): 777-95.
Ashenfelter, Orley, Henry Farber, and Michael Ransom. 2010. “Labor Market Monopsony,”
Journal of Labor Economics, 28: 203-10.
Barber, William. 1987. “Should the American Economic Association Have Toasted Simon
Newcomb at Is 100th Birthday Party?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (1): 179-83.
Becker, Gary. 1962. "Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 70
(February), pp. 1–13.
Becker, Gary. 1976. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Benham, Alexandra, and Lee Benham. 2010. “The Costs of Exchange.” In The Elgar Companion
to Transaction Cost Economics, eds. Peter Klein and Michael Sykuta, pp. 107-19.
Northampton: Elgar.
Blaug, Mark. 1985. Economic Theory in Retrospect, 4th ed. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Card, David, and Alan Krueger. 1995. Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the
Minimum Wage. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cheung, Steven. 1983. “The Contractual Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Law and Economics 26:
1-21.
25

Coase, Ronald. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 4 (November): 386-405.
Coase, Ronald. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics. 3
(October):1-44.
Coase, Ronald. 1988. The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Coase, 1991. “The Nature of the Firm: Meaning.” In The Nature of the Firm, eds. Oliver
Williamson and Sydney Winter, 48-60. New York: Oxford University Press.
Coase, Ronald. 1992. “The Institutional Structure of Production.” American Economic Review,
82 (4): 713-19.
Coase, Ronald. 1993. “Coase on Posner on Coase,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics, 149 (1): 96-98.
Deakin, Simon, and Frank Wilkinson. 2005. The Law of the Labor Market. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Demsetz, Harold. 1969. “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,” Journal of Law and
Economics, 12 (1): 1-22.
Demsetz, Harold. 1991. “The Theory of the Firm Revisited.” In The Nature of the Firm, eds.
Oliver Williamson and Sydney Winter, 159-78. New York: Oxford University Press.
Doucoliagos, Hristos, and Thomas Stanley. 2009. “Publication Selection Bias in Minimum Wage
Research? A Meta-regression Analysis,” British Journal of Economics, 47: 406-28.
Dow, Gregory. 1997. “The New Institutional Economics and Employment Regulation,”
in Bruce. Kaufman, ed., Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship,
Madison, Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 57-90.
Dunlop, John. 1984. “Industrial Relations and Economics: The Common Frontier of Wage

26

Determination.” In Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting, pp. 9-23.
Madison: Industrial Relations Research Association
Ely, Richard. 1884. The Past and Present of Political Economy. Baltimore: Murphy.
Fleischer, Belton, and Thomas Kniesner. 1980. Labor Economics: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 2 nd ed.
Engle Wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Foss, Nicholai, and Christian Knudsen. 1996. Towards a Competency Theory of the Firm. London:
Routledge.
Freeman, Richard, and James Medoff. 1984. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books.
Friedman, Milton. 1953. “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” In Milton Friedman, ed., Essays in
Positive Economics, pp. 3-43, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Furubotn, Erik, and Rudolf Richter. Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of
the New Institutional Economics, 2nd ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Harrison, Jeffrey, and Jules Theeuwes. 2008. Law and Economics. New York: Norton.
Hirsch, Barry, Bruce Kaufman, and Tetyana Zelenska. 2011. “Minimum Wage Channels of
Adjustment. Discussion Paper. Bonn: IZA
Hodgson, Geoffrey. 2001. How Economics Forgot History. London: Routledge.
Hodgson, Geoffry, and Thorbjørn Knudsen. 2007. “Firm-specific Learning and the Nature of
the Firm.” Revue économique (58 (2): 331-50.
Hovenkamp, Herbert. 1990. “The First Great Law and Economics Movement,” 42 Stanford Law
Review 993-1058.
Kaufman, Bruce. 2007. “The Impossibility of a Perfectly Competitive Labor Market,”
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31: 775-88.

27

Kaufman, Bruce. 2009. “Labor Law and Employment Regulation: Neoclassical and Institutional
Perspectives.” In K. Dau-Schmidt, S. Harris, and O. Lobel, eds., Labor and
Employment Law and Economics. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 3-58.
Kaufman, Bruce. 2010. “The Theoretical Foundation of Industrial Relations and Its Implications
for Labor Economics and Human Resource Management,” Industrial &Labor Relations
Review, 64: 74-108.
Langlois, Richard, and Paul Robertson. 1995. Firms, Markets, and Economic Change. London:
Routledge.
Lazear, Edward. 2000. “Economic Imperialism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (1): 99
-145.
Lehrer, Steven, and Nuno Pereira. 2007. “Worker Sorting, Compensating Differentials, and
Health Insurance: Evidence from Displaced Workers,” Journal of Health Economics,
26 (5): 1034-56.
Lester, Richard. 1952. “A Range Theory of Wage Differentials,” Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 5 (July): 433-50.
Mäki, Uskali. 1998. “Against Posner Against Coase Against Theory,” Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 22: 587-95.
Manning, Alan. 2003. Monopsony in Motion, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
McCloskey, Deirdre. 1997. “The Good Old Coase Theorem and the Good Old Chicago School:
A Comment on Zerbe and Medema.” In Coasean Economics: Law and Economics and
the New Institutional Economics, ed. Steven Medema, pp. 239-48. Boston: Kluwer.

28

Medema, Steven. 1996. “Ronald Coase and American Institutionalism.” In Research in the
History of Economic Thought and Methodology, pp. 51-92. Greenwich: JAI
Medema, Steven. 2010a. “Chicago Law and Economics.” In The Elgar Companion to the
Chicago School of Economics, ed. Ross Emmett, pp. 160-74. Northampton: Elgar.
Medema, Steven. 2010b. “Ronald H. Coase.” In The Elgar Companion to the Chicago School of
Economics, ed. Ross Emmett, pp. 259-64. Northampton: Elgar.
Mercuro, Nicholas, and Steven Medema. 1997. Economics and the Law: From Posner to PostModernism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Newcomb, Simon. 1884. “The Two Schools of Political Economy,” Princeton Review, 14: 291301.
Oppenheimer, Margaret, and Nicholas Mercuro. 2005. Law and Economics: Alternative
Economic Approaches to Legal and Regulatory Issues. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
Overtveldt, Johan van. 2007. The Chicago School: How the University of Chicago Assembled
Thinkers That Revolutionized Economics and Business. Chicago: Agate.
Pearson, Heath. 1997. Origins of Law and Economics: The Economists’ New Science of Law,
1830-1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Posner, Richard. 1984. “Some Economics of Labor Law,” 51 University of Chicago Law Review,
pp. 988-1011.
Posner, Richard. 1993a. “The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics,” Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1): 73-87.
Posner, Richard. 1993b. “Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase and Methodology,” Journal of
29

Economic Perspectives, 7 (4): 195-210.
Posner, Richard. 2007. Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed., Austin, Wolters-Kluwer.
Posner, Richard. 2010. “On the Receipt of the Ronald H. Coase Medal: Uncertainty, the
Economic Crisis, and the Future of Law and Economics,” American Law and Economics
Review, 12, (2): 265-79.
Reder, Melvin. 1982. “Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 20 (March): 1-38.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1991. “Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets.” In The Nature of the
Firm, eds.Oliver Williamson and Sydney Winter, 75-89. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Rutherford, Malcolm. 2011. The Institutionalist Movement in American Economics, 1918-1947:
Science and Social Control. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Samuels, Warren, and A. Allan Schmid. 1981. Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective.
Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Samuels, Warren, and Steven Medema. 1997. “Ronald Coase on Economic Policy Analysis:
Framework and Implications.” In Coasean Economics: Law and Economics and the New
Institutional Economics, ed. Steven Medema, pp. 161-84. Boston: Kluwer.
Schmid, A. Allan. 1987. Property, Power, and Public Choice. New York: Praeger.
Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1984. “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline
Device,” 74 American Economic Review, pp. 433-44.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. “Information and the Change of Paradigms in Economics.” American
Economic Review, 92 (3): 460-501.
Williamson, Oliver. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
30

Williamson, Oliver. 1993. “Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics,
Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, 149 (1): 99-118.
Zerbe, Richard, and Steven Medema. 1997. “Ronald Coase, the British Tradition, and the Future
of Economic Method.” In Coasean Economics: Law and Economics and the New
Institutional Economics, ed. Steven Medema, pp. 209-38. Boston: Kluwer.

31

Figure 1. Posner’s Two Fundamental Diagrams
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